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RECENT DECISIONS
Commission. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Ringwalt, 240 Fed. 1022 (3d Cir. 1917).
This was done, and the Commission took appropriate action. Federal Trade
Commission v. Ringwalt Linoleum Works, I F. T. C. 436 (1919).
In conclusion, it appears that the Stahly decision was against the weight
of authority, was based upon questionable theory, and was quite unnecessary,
since there was a statutory remedy created especially for the type of situation
involved.
John L. Goodell
CONFLICT OF LAWS - RIGHT TO BRING ACTION
BASED ON A TAX OR REVENUE STATUTE
IN A SISTER STATE
I. The county of Wayne, Michigan, brought an action in the New York
City Municipal Court to collect a personal property tax allegedly due and owing
from the defendant. Defendant's motion for a dismissal of the complaint was
granted on grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action.
The Appellate Term reversed. The Appellate Division reversed the Appellate
Term and reinstated the the judgment of the Municipal Court, holding that
as at matter of policy the New York courts do not lend themselves tothe en-
forcement of the revenue laws of another state. Wayne County v. American
Steel Export Co., 277 App. Div. 585, 101 N.Y. S. 2d 522 (Ist Dept. Dec. 1950).
II. The State of Ohio brought an action in Kentucky to recover certain
monies owed by the defendant to the Industrial Commission of the State of
Ohio for a workmen's compensation assessment. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals, reversing the circuit court, held that whether the action was one to
collect a tax due a sister state or one to enforce a transitory contract claim, the
Kentucky courts would entertain jurisdiction. Ohio v. Arnett, - Ky. -, 234
S. W. 2d 722 (Oct. 1950).
These holdings reached by Kentucky and New York reflect the divergent
views among our courts, both state and federal, as to whether or not one state
should permit its courts to be used by another state seeking to enforce a tax
claim. The Supreme Court has held that a judgment is not to be denied full
faith and credit merely because it is for taxes; Milwaukee County v. M. E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) ; but the Court expressly left open the ques-
tion whether a state is required under full faith and credit -to enforce the tax
claims of another'not yet reduced to judgment.
It has long been a general principle that state laws in and of themselves
have no extraterritorial effect. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S.
430 (1943) ; Mertz v.Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N. E. 2d 597, 108 A. L. R. 1120
(1936) ; but see 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (1948). However, states ordinarily enforce
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rights giving rise to transitory actions, though arising under the laws of sister
states. James Dickenson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119 (1926);
Silverman v. Rappaport, 165 Misc. 543, 300 N. Y. Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
"The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of
the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do
not close their doors unless help would violate some fundamental principle
of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep rooted tra-
dition of the common weal." Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 111,
120 N. E. 198, 202 (1918).
A forum will not enforce the penal laws of another state. Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892); Christilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 A. 711
(1913); Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338, 7 Am. Dec. 467 (N. Y. 1817). But
whether a statute is penal in the international sense, as contrasted with penal
in the ordinary sense, is dependent on the purpose of the statute. If the pur-
pose is to afford a private remedy to an aggrieved person injured by the wrong-
ful act of the defendant, rather than to punish an offense against public justice,
it is enforceable in all jurisdictions. Huntington v. Attrill, supra; Cross v.
Ryan, 124 F. 2d 883 (7th Cir. 1941); Bartlieb v. Carr, 94 F. Supp. 279 (E. D.
Ky- 1950). It must be kept in mind, however, that the forum will determine
for itself whether the law is penal or not. Huntington v. Attrill, supra.
Since an early English decision, Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. t. H. 85, 95 Eng.
Rep. 53 (1734), refused to give effect to a Portuguese revenue law, which
prohibited gold exportation, because it would have an adverse effect on English
trade [see Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns 94 (N. Y. 1806)], it has been
uniformly held that tax statutes of foreign countries will not be enforced.
Sydney v. Bull, [1909] 1 K. B. 7; Cermak v. Bata Akciova Spolesnost, 80
N. Y. S. 2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Matter of Spitzer's Estate, 170 Misc. 160, 9
N. Y. S. 2d 868 (Surf. Ct. 1939).
Due largely to the early belief that an obligation to pay taxes was penal
in nature [see Goodrich, Convict of Laws (1949 Ed.) att 163] and to an ex-
tension of the policyagainst the enforcement of tax statutes of foreign coun-
tries, it has been almost unanimously held that one state will not open its
courts to allow a sister state to bring an action; based on a tax or revenue law
of the sister state. Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921) ;
Matter of Martin's Will, 255 N. Y. 359, 174 N. E. 753 (1931); Maryland v.
Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 132 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Moore v. Mitchell,
30 F. 2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929); Detroit v. Proctor, 61 A. 2d 412 (Del. Super. 
Ct.
1948); Pratt v. Dean, 246 Mass. 300, 140 N. E. 924 (1923); cf.Henry v. Sar-
geant, 13N. H. 321,332, 40 Am. Dec. 146, 147 (1843).
"A well settled principle of private international law precludes one state
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from acting as a collector of taxes for a sister state, and from enforcing its
penal and revenue laws. The revenue laws of one state have no effect in an-
other." Colorado v. Harbeck, supra at 85.
Rarely have reasons been advanced in support of the majority doctrine.
Judge Learned Hand, concurring- in Moore v. Mitchell, supra, tried to justify
the rule, reasoning that the courts of one state should not be called upon to
scrutinize the relations of a foreign state with its own citizens, such as are
involved in its revenue laws, and thus commit the state of the forum to posi-
tions which might be seriously embarrassing to itself or its neighbors. But
this view would appear to be tenuous. It is not likely that the foreign state
would object or be offended, as it is the one seeking the relief and asking the
court to scrutinize the relations. More ill will could result by a refusal to
entertain the action.
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority, there is no adequate reason
for continued adherence to this dogma.. The influence of critics has found
expressionin two cases prior to Ohio v. Arnett, supra, one of the two principal
cases. See Holshouser v. Copper Co., 138 N. C. 178, 50 S. E. 650 (1905)-;
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rogers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S. Wq 2d 919,
165 A. L. R. 785 (1946). "The contrary doctrine [majority rule] . . was the
product of commercial rivalry and international suspicion. It has no place in a
union of states such as the United States where the interest of both state and
taxpayer will be protected from arbitrary power by the provisions of the. -
Federal Constitution. The taxpayer who enjoys the protection of the govern-
ment should bear his share of the expense of maintaining that government;
and he shouldn't be permitted to escape his obligation by crossing state lines."
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rogers, supra at 1128, 193 S. W. 2d at 927, 165
A. L. R. at 795. If unpaid taxes cannot be recovered, it increases the burden
of the other taxpayers.
The RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONFLICT OF LAWS, under comment C of
section 610, formerly ruled that "no action .can be maintained by a foreign
state to enforce its license or revenue laws, or claims for taxes." In the 1948
Supplerrent, comment C is deleted, and a caveat is added to the effect that
the American Law Institute "expresses no opinion as to whether an action can
be maintained by a foreign state on a claim for taxes." It is further stated that
if a position had to be taken, it would be desirable to state a view contrary to
the former comment C, and in accord with Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Rogers, supra.
A tax is not a punishment for a wrong; it is an obligation owed the sover-
eign to maintain necessary governmental functions. There is nothing in a
reasonable taxing statute that outrages public policy. It should rather be the
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policy of the state to entertain tax suits by sister states in order to prevent tax
avoidance. It would be advisable for the New York Court of Appeals to over-
rule Colorado v. Harbeck, supra, and adopt the modem approach as enunciated
in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rogers, in THE RESTATEMENT, and now by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Ohio v. Arnett.
Alvin M. Glick
